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Summary: A devastating criticism of a ‘hard core’ argumentation, stemming from skep-
tical authors, has strongly challenged an enthusiasm noticeable in most theoretical analy-
ses of globalization, bringing to light many ‘darker sides’ of the globalization phenom-
ena. A detailed critical re-examination of their often unrealistic assumptions has pre-
sented a very serious challenge to globalists and has made room for the arising of the so 
called ‘great globalization debate’, which has started over time to shape the mainstream 
of the contemporary social philosophy. In this paper we are closely looking into the way 
in which sceptics realize their devastating criticism of globalists′ argumentation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The starting point of the research into the great globalization debate was to con-
struct a relatively simple analytical frame which had been initiated in the previ-
ous paper (Tadic 2006). It was aimed at identifying critical globalists´ assump-
tion and to simplify the analysis of their often very complex argumentation. The 
follow-up of the research in which sceptics´ perspective will be presented as the 
other aspect of the debate will be assessed through the same analytical frame 
(Tadic 2006). Conceptualization of the globalization phenomenon, its causes and 
effects and the prediction of the future global development as its essential con-
stituents will be the three main topics at issue towards which sceptics´ argumen-
tation analysis will gravitate. 
The criticism is generally levelled at the destruction of the globalistic argu-
mentation hard core by which globalization represents a new epoch of the hu-
man history unprecedented in earlier times. For that reason, two methodological 
approaches which sceptics follow and upon which they base their conclusion 
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that mere concept of globalization has no explanatory or predictive value will be 
elaborated first. Based on this belief, sceptics continue with the gradual refuta-
tion of other (hyper) globalistic myths, particularly their often exaggerated inter-
pretations of the consequences of the globalization phenomenon. With reference 
to this, the following aspect will elaborate the sceptics´ criticism of the global-
ists´ solutions concerning economic, political and cultural issues as globalistic 
consequences. At the end, in the last instance, the sceptics´ alternative vision of 
the global change future development will be presented as; it will turn out that 
way, based on a completely different belief compared to quite naive, neoliberal 
prophecies about “the end of history“(Fykujama 1989). 
 
2. Sceptics 
 
The majority of globalists´ assumptions, especially those radical ones, has came 
under attack of sceptically oriented theoreticians
1 for whom globalization is not 
“an epochal transformation of world affairs“ but a myth which “conceals the 
reality of an international economy increasingly segmented into three major 
regional blocs in which national governments remain very powerful“ (Held et al. 
1999, p. 2). With purpose of refuting of the hard core of hyperglobalists´ argu-
mentation, sceptics usually conduct careful empirical testing of the “the strong 
globalist thesis“ mentioned above. There are two main methodological models 
under which this is realized. The first direction dominant over the greater part of 
sceptical analysis is based upon constructing abstract models of global economy, 
global culture and world society and upon recognizing how much the contempo-
rary trends of social movements correspond to those “ideal-type“ constructions 
(Held and McGrew 2000, p. 4). In their book Globalization in Question, proba-
bly the strongest critique of “the strong globalist thesis“, Hirst and Thompson 
are starting from the very same, predominantly Weber Ian mode of analysis, i.e. 
from constructing two ideal types: an international economy and an authentically 
                                                 
1 The term sceptics labels quite an incoherent group of authors which include such different posi-
tions as: radicals (Robert Gillpin /2001/, Linda Weiss /1998/), according to whom globalization 
represent just another name for a new form of the Western (especially the American) imperialism; 
conservatives, e.g. realists and neorealists (Stephen Krasner /1995/, Samuel Huntington /1993/, 
Kenneth Waltz /1999/), who consider globalization as nothing less than a project of states, espe-
cially of those powerful ones, without whose hegemony (dominant role) the current international 
system will be doomed; social-democrats (Pol Hirst and Graham Thompson /1999/); interdepend-
ence theoreticians; multiculturalists, who stress all the dangers of cultural homogenization and its 
devastating effects on local traditions; a variety of ecological activists who fear the destructive 
ecological effects of uncontrolled globalization and many others. All of them, in spite of obvious 
differences in disciplinary frames, are stressing the devastating destruction of local traditions, 
continuous marginalization of poor countries and regions, ecological destruction and homogeniza-
tion of culture and everyday life (Kellner 1997). 
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global economy and they form a very distinct line between the two.
2 Whereas 
the former is still fundamentally characterized by “the exchange between rela-
tively distinct national economies“, the latter is identified as a perfectly inte-
grated world market, in which “the law of one price“ is dominating feature 
(Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 7). According to this, the authors conclude that 
“globalization in its radical since should denote the development of a completely 
new economic structure, not just conjuctural changes toward an increased inter-
national trade and investments“ (Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 7). The authors´ 
justification for more than obvious economism lies in simple logic that if they 
successfully compromise the radical globalist thesis on economic globalization, 
the other theses on arising the global culture and the global policy will be refuted 
altogether. 
Like Hirst and Thompson, the leading neorealist Kenneth Waltz (1999) in-
sists on the need for differentiation between global and interdependent econ-
omy.
3 According to Waltz 
 
“Economic globalization would mean that the world economy, or 
at least the globalized portion of it, would be integrated and not 
merely interdependent. The difference between an interdependent 
and an integrated world is a qualitative one and not a mere matter 
of proportionately more trade and a greater and more rapid flow 
of capital. With integration, the world would look like one big 
state. Economic markets and economic interests cannot perform 
the functions of government. Integration requires or presumes a 
government to protect, direct, and control. Interdependence, in 
contrast to integration, is "the mere mutualism" of states, as 
Emile Durkheim
4 put it.“ (Waltz 1999) 
                                                 
2 These ideal types, as Hirst and Thompson say (1999, p. 7), are valuable as being useful in ena-
bling the specification of the differences between a new global economy and merely extensive and 
intensifying international economic relationships. “An extreme and one-sided ideal type of this 
kind enables differentiation of the degrees of internationality“ (Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 7).  
3 The concept of interdependence, which Waltz is obviously alluding on, marked in his time genu-
ine small revolution in academic discipline of international relations (politics), strengthening the 
importance of the international political economy, which was mainly neglected belonging to the 
realm of that discipline. The Harvard professor Richard Cooper, in his book The Economy of 
Interdependence (1968), was the first one to point to the increasing importance of economic inter-
dependence among states. Relying on his ideas, Cooper’s Harward colleagues Robert Keohane and 
Joseph Nye Jr. went on analyzing the concept mentioned and it brought on a hypothesis of grow-
ing complex interdependence among nations. In their, nowadays already classical book, Power and 
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (1977), the authors suggest that a new era of inter-
national relations is here to stay and that they cannot be considered as a geostrategic competition 
among states any more. Economic issues, new means of communication and new patterns of coop-
eration mark the increase of the world politics in which the international political economy and 
international institutions play a critical part (see more Woods 2001, p. 283). 
4 a noted French sociologist. 
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Waltz claims that the concept of globalization lacks some aspects, pointing 
to a very simple fact – the fact that the majority of world is left behind, far away 
of globalistic processes, which particularly applies to most of Africa and Latin 
America, Russia, all the Middle East except Israel, and large parts of Asia. 
Moreover, for many countries, the degree of participation in the global economy 
varies by region. Northern Italy, for example, is in; southern Italy is out (Waltz 
1999). “Globalization“ concludes Waltz is, in fact, “not global at all, but is 
mainly limited to northern latitudes“ (Waltz 1999). 
The second important methodological direction has to do with comparing 
the current trends with those of more than a hundred years ago – with the golden 
standard epoch between 1870 and 1914, which is often marked as belle époque 
of globalization by some economic historians.
5 On the basis of the comparison 
between the contemporary economic trends and those of a hundred years ago, 
sceptics have come to a conclusion that the extent of today’s internationalization 
is not historically unprecedented (Bairoch and Kozul-Wright 1996; Hirst and 
Thompson 1999; Kozul-Wright and Rayment 2004). That is more than obvious 
when the following is taken into account: firstly, the ratios of national economies 
trade openness in the period before World War I are higher than those of today; 
secondly, although the current gross capital flows are far larger in comparison to 
the previous period, the real net flows are, at least the same; and thirdly, the 
migration flows in 19th century exceed those of today (Held and McGrew 2000, 
p. 3). All this point to a conclusion that today’s world economy is much less 
integrated than it was in the golden standard epoch. "Contrary to popular belief“ 
says Kevin O´Rourke “the most impressive episode of international economic 
integration which the world has seen to date was not the second half of the 20th 
century, but the years between 1870 and the Great War. The 19th century, and in 
particular the late 19th century, was the period that saw the largest decline ever 
in inter-continental barriers to trade and factor mobility“ (O´Rourke 2000, p. 2). 
The purpose of the reminding about the classical gold standard era at the end 
of 19th and the beginning of 20th century, particularly about its catastrophic 
crash embodied in the Great Depression, is to show that contemporary trends of 
internationalization and liberalization are not irreversible at all (Kozul-Wright 
and Rayment 2004, p. 3). Accordingly, some neorealists claim that without the 
leadership of the United States as the only hegemonic state presently, the multi-
lateral system created after World War II would have collapsed by itself (Gillpin 
2001). In the same way and the same scope, the world economy managing still 
depends on will and interest of the United State (as the world’s most powerful 
economic subject) to supervise and shape the existing system. The general con-
clusion which sceptics draw from the basis of the previous analysis is that the 
                                                 
5 see more: Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), Hirst and Thompson (1999), Drache (1999), Garrett 
(2000). 
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term globalization represents nothing more than a most common ideological 
construction, “a necessary myth“
6, with one purpose: to hide the US government 
global hegemonic project encapsulated in the so-called Washington consensus – 
a link between the American government, World Bank and International Mone-
tary Fund – mainly oriented towards further expansion of the neoliberal policies 
throughout the world.
7  
What the two methodological direction has in common is the assumption 
that only empirical evidence per se can provide the final truth about the nature of 
globalization phenomenon. The sceptics´ conclusive argument is that the term 
itself is incoherently deficient; the terms like internationalization, regionalization 
or triadization have much higher explanatory and descriptive value and provide a 
much better conceptualization of contemporary affairs.  
As it has previously been mentioned, most sceptics are strongly reluctant to 
the idea that a unique global economy is arising or is already in existence. Their 
summary argument is that if evidence confirms anything at all, it is only further 
internationalization of economic activity, i.e. more and more intensification of 
the links between distinct national economies (Held and McGrew 2000, p. 20). 
However, although sceptics generally do not disapprove of the increasing inter-
nationalization of economic trends (mostly with reference to the growing finan-
cial capital mobility), they have been warning against interpreting those trends 
as the arising of the genuine global capitalism which is transcending national 
economies.
8 In that respect, one of the main targets of the assault is a deep-
rooted (hyper)globalistic belief that the forces of globalization unconditionally 
lead to convergence towards a laissez-faire capitalism. On the contrary, sceptics 
point out that the divergent forms of capitalism, that is, the market, the mixed 
and the state capitalism are still vital enough. Correspondingly, Michael Mann 
writes about the major differences still existing among the Anglo-Saxon neolib-
eral capitalism, the European social-democratic mixed economy and develop-
ment states in East Asia (Mann 1997, p. 141-142). The globalistic thesis, as 
Waltz says, that “economic and technological forces impose near uniformity of 
political and economic forms and functions on states“ is in that way refuted.
9
The second important conclusion which sceptics draw upon a detailed em-
pirical investigation of contemporary trends of economic activities is related to 
                                                 
6 In that sense, a French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu writes that the globalization is “a myth in a 
full meaning of the word, one mighty discourse, a “powerful idea“, an idea which carries social 
power“ (Bourdieu 2003, p. 38). 
7 see more: Held and McGrew (2000, p. 5), Brecher (2003) 
8 cited in Held (2000, p. 20). For a detailed elaboration see: Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 
Hirst and Thompson (1999); Drache (1999).  
9 The author continues in the same manner: “trade and technology do not determine a single best 
way to organize a polity and its economy. National systems display a great deal of resilience. Most 
states survive, and the units that survive in competitive systems are those with the ability to 
adapt“ (Waltz 1999). On states´ transformative capacities see more: Weiss (1998), Josifidis (2001, 
2004). 
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the fact that trade, investments and financial flows usually fluctuate among three 
main economic blocks: the European Union, the North America and the Pacific 
Rome.
10 All that points to the fact that the world economy is far from being per-
fectly integrated; quite the contrary, it is evident that fragmentation of the world 
into regional blocks is taking place, featured in the tendency to strengthen eco-
nomic interdependence and transactions within them but not among them. 
Moreover, there is a much stronger triadisation of economic activities going on, 
whose bottom line leads to a further marginalization of the so called Third 
World. 
In addition, contrary to a hiperglobalistic myth, some sceptics claim that 
truly transnational corporations are very rare indeed.
11 It is more than obvious 
when it is known that only a small number of multinational companies (even the 
biggest ones) have their residence outside their indigenous countries and that 
their competitive advantage still depends on the national innovation systems 
(Cogut 2003). All this, sceptics argue, drive to the conclusion that the national 
foundations are still very important. 
Discarding the thesis on footloose capital mobility, sceptics are at the same 
time undermining the hyperglobalistic argumentation about deindustrialization 
of the leading OECD industrial countries; in other words, sceptics´ assault is 
particularly aimed at the assumption that the majority of multinational activities 
is being transferred to South (the so called “outsourcing“) which is causing a 
greater interdependence between North and South. According to some hyper-
globalists, the former marks nothing less than the rising of a new global division 
of labour, which is characterized by the transference of the core economies from 
predominantly manufacturing production to services, as well as from primary to 
manufacturing production in developing countries. As opposed to that, sceptic’s 
claim that the evidence does not support this dramatically shift in the structure of 
the international division of labour and argue that globalists are deliberately 
overlooking a further gap-deepening between North and South.
12
As opposed to explicit scepticism about the very existence of the global 
economy, sceptics are generally optimistic about possibilities of the international 
economy effective management, which, as it has been mentioned before, still 
depends on the great forces´ capacities and interests (particularly the USA) to 
supervise and direct the existing regime.
13 Thus, one of the radical globalists´ 
                                                 
10 According to Robert Gillpin “most trade takes place among the three advanced industrialized 
economies - the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, plus a few emerging markets in East 
Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere“ (Gillpin 2001). The author claims that an economic regional-
ism represents the wave of future. “Today“ writes Gillpin “economic regionalism has reached 
flood tide and is having a significant impact on the international economy“ (Gillpin 2001). 
11 see Hirst and Thompson (1999, p. 2 and pp. 195-196) 
12 see more in Held and McGrew (2000, p. 21) 
 
13 Hirst and Thompson say there exist more different modalities of effective international economy 
management: 1. through agreements among leading industrial states, particularly among G3; 2. 
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basic assumptions that states are helpless victims of globalization is being re-
futed. On the other hand, sceptics argue that national states (especially powerful 
ones) are their main agents and architects. The market, goes the argument, can-
not or will never be able to replace the functions of national governments be-
cause without their controlling, protecting and managing role there are no pre-
requisites for successful integration. The main conclusion related to the previous 
point is that contemporary trends of internationalization have not changed the 
basic postulates of managing the international economy. 
The previous conclusion is in the same manner related to the problem of 
managing the national economic space. As far as sceptics are concerned, the 
state remains the legitimate national manager (though only to some extent) in 
spite of the explicit trend of economic internationalization (Hirst and Thompson 
1999, p. 171). There is a continuity of welfare state in most advanced industrial 
states which also speaks in favour of it.
14 Sceptics argue that there is no evidence 
which would confirm the globalistic claim that the pressures from global finan-
cial markets significantly deter governments in realization of their redistributive 
strategies. Thus, according to Rieger and Leibfried there has not been any radi-
cal decrease of welfare state due to economic globalization in any Western 
European country (Rieger and Leibfried 2000, p. 336). The authors come to 
conclusion that the stronger the pressure of globalization and the more open a 
country’s economy is, the more difficult it becomes to touch the status quo of 
the welfare state. Geoffrey Garret goes one step further to suggests a quite radi-
cal assumption that the growing internationalization (more precisely, the increas-
ing liquid capital mobility) is even connected with the fast-growing government 
expenditure (Garret 1998, p. 301)! On that account, the author claims that the 
average state consumption as GDP proportion inside the OECD states almost 
doubled from 1960-s till mid 1990-s by which it reached near half of the overall 
output. 
In that way, the central sceptics´ point related to the preservation of state’s 
power and functions has been reached: the world, as they argue, is still state-
centric while today’s states are more powerful than ever, particularly in relation 
to their capacity for effective management of domestic and international eco-
nomic activities.
 15 In that respect, Waltz writes that 
                                                                                                                          
through international regulative agencies, such as WTO; 3. through trade blocks, e.g. EU or 
NAFTA; 4. through nationally founded policies etc. (Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 189). 
14 According to sceptics, the general belief by which irresistible globalization pressures narrow the 
welfare state doesn’t hold. For a detailed analysis of relationship between neoliberalism and wel-
fare state see more Josifidis and Prekajac (2005). 
15 “This is not the end of the nation-state, and even less the end of government“ say Yergin and 
Stanislav (2000, p. 321). Simirarly, Robert Gillpin emphasizes that this is the world in which 
national policies and domestic economies are still “the main determinants of economic affairs“ 
(Gillpin 2001). For a sharp criticism of the end of state thesis see also: Mann (1997, p. 146), Weiss 
(1998), Hirst and Thompson (1999), Waltz (1999). 
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“International politics remains inter-national  (italic by 
T.T.). Global or world politics has not taken over from na-
tional politics. The twentieth century was the century of the 
nation-state. The twenty-first will be too.“ (Waltz 1999) 
 
Politics, as Kenneth Waltz concludes, “as usual, prevails over economics“ 
(Waltz 1999). 
Finally, sceptics also disregard the hyperglobalistic thesis on arising the first 
global civilization characterized by universal cultural patterns as a most common 
illusion: contrary to that, they point out that further deepening of nationalism, 
religious fundamentalism strengthening, is causing the fragmentation of the 
world into civilization’s blocks as well as cultural and ethnic enclaves. As Sam-
uel Huntington warns, it is not “the end of history“ but “the clash of civiliza-
tions“ that the world is slipping in (Huntington 1996). 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The essential points of the previous extensive analysis can be summarized as 
shown in table 1. 
The brief summary of the great globalization debate central points reveals a 
deep-rooted gap between globalistic and sceptic notion of the globalization’s 
basic essence. The conclusion has particularly been emphasized by diametrically 
opposite conceptual frames of globalization phenomenon, different understand-
ings of its causes and consequences as well as by diverse prediction of its future 
trajectory. Namely, whereas globalists, generally speaking, determine globaliza-
tion as a qualitatively new epoch unprecedented in earlier history which main 
causes can be found in the very structure of capitalism or, as some moderate 
globalists would say, in combined forces of modernity, sceptics disregard this 
thesis as a most common myth, i.e. an ideological project of the West. If the 
gravity centre of analysis is shifted to the domain of the most important conse-
quences of globalization, then the different notions of the globalization phe-
nomenon are even more emphasized. While hyperglobalists are celebrating the 
arising of the first truly global civilization based on its own mechanisms of 
global economy, global politics and global culture, sceptics claim that the con-
temporary trends are pointing nothing more but the intensification of economy 
internationalization in which national governments and national cultural identi-
ties remain very important indeed. Settled in between these polarities (but still 
remaining under globalistic perspective), there are those scholars, arguing that 
something is really going on, that globalization is generating some effects, which 
are, certainly, although gradually, changing the old structures and relations. That 
is evident from the evolution of postindustrial economies, the reconstruction of 
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state power and the hybridization of national cultures as a logical consequence 
of the dialectics of global and local influences. The culmination of the great 
globalization debate is represented in absolutely different visions about the fu-
ture trajectory of global change. For most hyperglobalists, today’s happenings 
mark nothing less but the beginning of the end of history; in contrast, sceptics 
argue that the history is far from its ending but the world is on the verge of the 
clash between civilizations, fragmentation and chaos. As opposed to these pre-
dominantly deterministic views, there is an explicit indeterminism noticeable in 
the most tranformationalist analyses, which represent a logical consequence of 
their notion of globalization as an essentially contingent and contradictory his-
torical process which by itself excludes all the possibilities of any predetermined 
pattern of future development. 
  
Table 1. The central points of globalists and sceptics 
  Globalists 
  Radical Moderate 
 
Sceptics 
I Conceptualization  A new era  A contingent and 
contradictory 
historical process  
Nothing new; 
ideology and 
myth 
 
II Main causes  Laissez faire capi-
talism and tech-
nology 
Combined forces 
of modernity 
Project of the 
West 
III Main conse-
quences 
    
      a) economic  New global econ-
omy 
Post-industrial 
economy 
Internationali-
sation of 
economy 
      b) political  The end of state; 
global govern-
ment 
Reconstruction 
and restructuring 
of state power 
States are 
more powerful 
than ever 
      c) cultural  Homogenization Hybridization  Fragmentation 
IV Future predic-
tion 
The end of his-
tory, 
global  civilization 
 
Indeterminism 
 
Clash of civili-
zations 
 
Source: Some parts of table 1 are taken from Held et all. (1999, p. 10) 
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Debata o globalizaciji: Globalisti 
 
Rezime: Većina pretpostavki globalista, naročito onih radikalnih, našla se na udaru 
žestoke kritike skeptički orijentisanih teoretičara za koje globalizacija nije epohalna 
transformacija svetskih poslova, već najobičniji mit, odnosno ideološki projekat Zapada. 
Opovrgavanje tvrdog jezgra hiperglobalističke argumentacije skeptici najčešće realizuju 
kroz prizmu dva osnovna metodološka okvira. Prvi pravac, koji dominira u najvećem 
broju skeptičkih analiza, sastoji se u konstruisanju apstraktnih modela globalne ekono-
mije, globalne kulture i svetskog društva i utvrđivanju u kojoj meri savremeni trendovi 
društvenih kretanja odgovaraju naznačenim idealno-tipskim konstrukcijama. Drugi va-
žan metodološki pravac odnosi se na upoređivanje savremenih trendova sa onima od pre 
više od jednog stoleća – tačnije sa epohom zlatnog standarda od 1870-1914, koju pojedi-
ni ekonomski istoričari često označavaju kao belle époque globalizacije. Zajedničko za 
oba metodološka pristupa jeste pretpostavka da samo empirijska evidencija per se može 
da pruži konačnu istinu o prirodi fenomena globalizacije. 
Generalan zaključak koji skeptici izvlače na osnovu detaljnog kritičkog preispitiva-
nja globalističke argumentacije jeste da globalizacija ne predstavlja ništa drugo do najo-
bičniju ideološku konstrukciju – "neophodan mit" – koji služi da bi se prikrio globalni 
hegemoni projekat SAD, ovaploćen u takozvanom Vašingtonskom konsenzusu – sprezi 
Američke vlade, Svetske banke i Međunarodnog monetarnog fonda u globalnom širenju 
neoliberalnih politika širom sveta. Sâm taj termin – sumarni je argument skeptika – 
suštinski je nedostatan; mnogo veću eksplanatornu i deskriptivnu vrednost imaju pojmo-
vi kao što su: internacionalizacija, regionalizacija ili trijadizacija, kojima se daleko bolje 
mogu konceptualizovati savremena zbivanja. 
Jedna od glavnih meta skeptičkog napada jeste hiperglobalistička argumentacija o 
izrastanju, odnosno postojanju jedinstvene globalne ekonomije. Ako evidencija potvrđu-
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je bilo šta, mišljenje je većine skeptika, onda je to daljnja internacionalizacija ekonom-
ske aktivnosti, to jest, sve jača intezifikacija veza između zasebnih nacionalnih ekonomi-
ja.  
Drugi značajan zaključak koji skeptici izvlače na osnovu iscrpnog empirijskog ispi-
tivanja savremenih trendova ekonomskih aktivnosti odnosi se na činjenicu da trgovina, 
investicije i finansijski tokovi fluktuiraju uglavnom unutar i između tri glavna ekonom-
ska bloka: Evropske unije, Severne Amerike i Pacifičkog Rima. Sve to, tvrde ovi autori, 
ukazuje da je svetska ekonomija daleko od perfektno integrisane; ono što je, nasuprot 
tome, evidentno jeste fragmentacija sveta na regionalne blokove (štaviše na sceni je 
trijadizadija ekonomskih aktivnosti), pri čemu je izražena tendencija jačanja ekonomske 
međuzavisnosti i transakcija unutar navedenih regiona, a ne između njih.  
Nadalje, nasuprot hiperglobalističkom mitu, pojedini skeptici tvrde da su istinske 
transnacionalne korporacija veoma retke i da vrlo malo broj (čak i onih najvećih) ima 
sedišta izvan matičnih zemalja pri čemu njihova konkurentska prednost i dalje u najvećoj 
meri zavisi od nacionalnih sistema inovacija. Sve to, smatraju skeptici, upućuje na zak-
ljučak da je za većinu ovih korporacija nacionalna utemeljenost i dalje veoma bitna. 
Odbacujući tezu o nesputanoj mobilnosti kapitala, skeptici istovremeno potkopavaju 
i hiperglobalističku argumentaciju o deindustrijalizaciji vodećih industrijskih zemalja 
OECD-a, kao i njihove pretpostavke o izrastanju nove globalne podele rada čiju osnovnu 
karakteristiku predstavlja prelazak ekonomija centra sa predominantno manufakturne 
proizvodnje na uslužnu, i zemalja u razvoju sa primarne na manufakturnu proizvodnju. 
Skeptici, nasuprot tome, ukazuju da evidencija ne podupire ovaj dramatičan obrt u struk-
turi međunarodne podele rada, i smatraju da je reč o najobičnijem preterivanju, čime se 
namerno previđa daljnje produbljivanje jaza na relaciji Sever-Jug. 
Za razliku od izraženog skepticizma u pogledu postojanja globalne ekonomije, skep-
tici su generalno optimistični oko mogućnosti efektivnog upravljanja međunarodnom 
ekonomijom, pri čemu ono, kao što je već rečeno, i dalje u najvećoj meri zavisi od kapa-
citeta i interesa velikih sila (posebno Sjedinjenih Država) da nadziru i usmeravaju posto-
jeći poredak. Time se dodatno ruši još jedna od bazičnih pretpostavki radikalnih globali-
sta – teza da su države nemoćne žrtve globalizacije. Upravo suprotno, tvrde skeptici, 
nacionalne države (naročito one moćne) njeni su glavni agenti i arhitekti.  
Prethodni zaključak se u istoj meri odnosi i na problematiku upravljanja nacional-
nim ekonomskim prostorom. Država, prema skepticima, i dalje ostaje legitimni nacio-
nalni menadžer (doduše u donekle manjoj meri), usprkos izraženom trendu ka internaci-
onalizaciji ekonomije. S tim u vezi, skeptici tvrde da je svet i dalje strogo državo-
centričan, dok su države danas moćnije nego ikad, naročito u pogledu kapaciteta za efi-
kasno upravljanje domaćim i međunarodnim ekonomskim aktivnostima. 
Konačno, skeptici odbacuju hiperglobalističku tezu o skorom izrastanju prve glo-
balne civilizacije koja se karakteriše univerzalnim kulturnim obrascima, kao najobičniju 
iluziju; nasuprot tome, oni ukazuju na daljnje produbljivanje nacionalizma, jačanje ver-
skog fundamentalizma, što, u krajnjoj liniji, dovodi do fragmentacije sveta na civilizacij-
ske blokove i kulturne i etničke enklave. Sve to je navelo pojedine skeptike, poput Sem-
juela Hantingona, na tvrdnju da svet nije pred “krajem istorije“ već nezadrživo klizi ka 
“sukobu civilizacija“. 
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